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Non-technical Summary 
 
Vertical integration of electricity distribution network operator and electricity supplier is a 
key issue in European energy markets, in particular since the European Commission (EC) has 
initiated a sector inquiry in 2005. The EC argues that vertical separation of electricity 
networks from other activities (such as production and retail) increases consumer surplus, 
while opponents argue that vertical integration enables cost savings due to economies of 
scope. The European Competition Commission too indicates the disadvantage of vertical 
integration in energy markets for retail customers caused by potential discrimination of 
competitors. Aiming at preventing non-price discrimination the EC suggests alternative 
regulatory approaches to overcome the challenge of vertical integration. Legal unbundling, as 
an intermediate approach between ownership unbundling and vertical integration, describes a 
particular type of separation. In this case, the regulation requires legal separation of a grid unit 
from the retail/production and the operation of the grid by independent management. 
 
In a theoretical model we show that vertically integrated incumbents in the electricity market 
might have an incentive to favor their own downstream unit over competitors. We distinguish 
between demand decreasing and cost increasing non-price discrimination. Delaying supplier-
switching or withholding important information from competitors are examples for such types 
of non-price discrimination. This discriminatory behavior might affect the retail prices. 
Therefore, consumers might be worse off if the distribution network operator and the 
downstream retail incumbent remain vertically integrated. We further consider the effects that 
arise from introducing legal unbundling as already implemented in several European 
Countries. In line with other studies, the results show the legal unbundling regime to be 
favorable if it works perfectly, i.e. can indeed prevent non-price discrimination.  
 
To test our hypotheses derived from the theoretical model we employ cross-sectional data for 
geographically separated submarkets for household customers in Germany, each served by 
one distribution network operator, one downstream retail incumbent and a number of small 
energy providers. As the vertical structure is heterogeneous across the 850 German electricity 
submarkets for residential customers (there exist legally unbundled, vertically integrated or 
fully separated firms), we use firm level data to analyze the effects of different vertical 
structures and regulation schemes on retail electricity prices. We find significantly higher 
prices in markets with vertically integrated firms compared to markets with fully separated 
firms. This finding could indicate non-price discrimination. Furthermore, we find no evidence 
that legal unbundling eliminates the incentives for non-price discrimination because the prices 
do not differ from prices in markets under vertical integration. Therefore, we suggest 
implementing stricter rules for sufficient legal unbundling to prevent potential discrimination 
against competitors. 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
 
Im Gutachten der Europäischen Kommission (2005) über Entwicklung der europaweiten 
Liberalisierung der Energiemärkte zeigt sich, dass vertikale Integration der Netzbetreiber mit 
den Stromlieferanten weiterhin ein Problemfeld für die Entwicklung des Wettbewerbs 
darstellt. Die Europäische Kommission weist daraufhin, dass vertikale Integration Potenzial 
zur Diskriminierung von Konkurrenten in sich birgt und dadurch die 
Wettbewerbsentwicklung deutlich hemmt. Deshalb wird einerseits argumentiert, dass eine 
Separierung der Netzbetreiber vom Stromlieferanten Vorteile für Endkunden haben kann. 
Andrerseits sind möglicherweise Kopplungseffekte vorhanden, die einen effizienten bzw. 
kostengünstigen Betrieb gewährleisten. Um einen Mittelweg zu finden wurde ein sogenanntes 
„Legal Unbundling“, eine erweiterte rechtliche Separierung, vorgeschlagen. Dabei sind die 
Stromlieferanten verpflichtet den Netzbetrieb von anderen Aktivitäten des Unternehmens zu 
trennen. Dies beinhaltet nicht nur die rechtliche Trennung des Netzes in eine neu gegründete 
Tochtergesellschaft, sondern auch den Einsatz von einem von der Muttergesellschaft 
unabhängigen Management. Hierdurch wird versucht sowohl die finanzielle, funktionelle als 
auch die informationelle Entkopplung zu gewährleisten. Im Gegensatz zur 
eigentumsrechtlichen Separierung bleibt bei der erweiterten rechtlichen Separierung das 
Eigentum weiterhin beim Stromlieferanten. Welche Form der Regulierung jedoch die 
geeignetere ist, wurde bislang nur in wenigen theoretischen Arbeiten untersucht. 
 
Wir knüpfen an die theoretische Literatur an und untersuchen zunächst, ob vertikale 
Integration Anreize für eine nicht-preisliche Diskriminierung bietet. Dabei unterscheiden wir 
zwischen zwei Diskriminierungsformen: nachfrage-senkende und kosten-erhöhende 
Diskriminierung der Konkurrenten. So können beispielsweise absichtliche Verzögerungen 
beim Kundenwechsel oder Verzögerungen bei der Weitergabe von wichtigen Daten sowohl 
die Kosten als auch die Nachfrage der Konkurrenten beeinflussen. Wir zeigen, dass solche 
Anreize für vertikal integrierte Unternehmen theoretisch vorhanden sind. Die Einführung von 
„Legal Unbundling“ könnte jedoch diesen Anreizen effektiv entgegen wirken, wenn diese 
Form der Regulierung die Abhängigkeit des Netzbetreibers von der Muttergesellschaft 
tatsächlich reduziert bzw. vollständig beseitigt. 
 
Wir testen unsere theoretisch abgeleiteten Hypothesen mithilfe von Daten für geographisch 
separierte Haushaltsmärkte in Deutschland. Da in Deutschland etwa 850 Märkte vorhanden 
sind und diese Märkte unterschiedliche vertikale Strukturen aufweisen, wird der Test unserer 
Hypothesen hierdurch ermöglicht. Dabei nutzen wir (Angebots-) Daten auf Firmenebene und 
für Marktnachfrage verwenden wir demographische Daten auf Marktebene. Die Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass in Märkten mit vertikal integrierten ehemaligen Monopolisten die Preise für 
Haushaltskunden im Durchschnitt höher sind als in Märkten mit vollkommen unabhängigen 
bzw. eigentumsrechtlich separierten Stromlieferanten. Dies könnte auf eine mögliche nicht-
preisliche Diskriminierung deuten. Zudem zeigen unsere Schätzungen, dass „Legal 
Unbundling“ nicht notwendigerweise bessere Ergebnisse, in Form von niedrigeren 
Endkundenpreisen, erzielt. Deshalb sollte eine straffere Regulierung bzw. die strikte 
Implementierung der Regelungen durch die Regulierungsbehörden auferlegt werden. 
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Introduction  
 
Vertical integration of energy network operator and supplier is a key issue in European energy 
markets, in particular since the European Commission (EC) has initiated a sector inquiry in 
2005. The EC argues that vertical separation of electricity networks from other activities 
(such as production and retail) increases consumer surplus, while opponents argue that 
vertical integration enables cost savings due to economies of scope.
4
 In a number of speeches, 
former European Competition Commissioner Kroes indicates the disadvantage of vertical 
integration in energy markets for retail customers caused by insufficient unbundling of 
electricity transmission/distribution and supply activities.
5
  
 
A large number of studies put forward the effects of vertical integration of an upstream 
monopolist offering an essential input to a competitive downstream market. Without any 
regulation, the upstream monopolist might favor its own downstream unit either with price-
privileges or non-price-privileges. While price discrimination directly affects competitors’ 
input costs, non-price discrimination (“sabotage”) might influence quality, customer 
preferences, cost, and, finally, the demand.  To prevent price discrimination upstream price 
regulation can be installed, but non-price discrimination remains an issue. In general, such 
non-price discrimination is legally prohibited, but can hardly be detected by the regulation 
authority (Economides, 1998; Beard et al., 2001).  
 
The literature on non-price discrimination distinguishes between alternative approaches, e.g. 
raising rivals’ costs, in case of information asymmetry, or reducing rivals’ quality. Vickers 
(1995) analyses welfare effects of a vertically integrated upstream monopolist who provides 
price regulated upstream services and simultaneously acts in the retail market. Furthermore, 
he assumes the regulator to be imperfectly informed about upstream costs. This fact allows 
the monopolist to select a wholesale price from a set of prices. Vickers shows that due to 
information asymmetry, upstream regulation cannot completely prevent discrimination 
incentives. Sappington (2006) extends Vickers’ setup by including economies of scope and 
                                                 
4
 ERGEG Publications: Status Review of DSO Unbundling with Reference to GGP on Functional and 
Informational Unbundling for DSOs, 2009. 
5
 Examples are: Neelie Kroes: Improving Europe's energy markets through more competition SPEECH/07/115), 
Neelie Kroes: More Competition and Greater Energy Security in the Single European Market for Electricity and 
Gas (SPEECH/07/212) …“ In Germany the market is dominated by vertically-integrated companies, and the 
retail energy prices for small users are higher than in countries where energy companies have been unbundled, 
such as the UK.” 
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non-price discrimination. He confirms previous findings concerning higher retail prices due to 
vertical integration.
6
 
Mandy and Sappington (2006) consider an alternative approach of non-price discrimination 
with an upstream provider able to influence not only competitor’s costs, but also demand, by 
reducing the product quality. The authors show that both cost-increasing discrimination and 
quality-reducing discrimination are profitable under Cournot competition. However, only 
cost-increasing discrimination is profitable under Bertrand competition. Our theoretical 
model, which we use to derive our hypotheses, is related to Mandy and Sappington (2006). 
Similarly we analyze the effects of cost-increasing and demand-reducing non-price 
discrimination, and, in contrast, we consider a Hotelling game because we firmly believe the 
total market demand in energy markets for household customers to be price inelastic in a short 
run. Furthermore, we believe that the customers’ choice on energy supplier depends not only 
on the energy price, but also on firm preference. 
 
Aiming at preventing non-price discrimination the European Commission suggests alternative 
regulatory approaches to overcome the challenge of vertical integration. Legal unbundling, as 
an intermediate approach between ownership unbundling and vertical integration, describes a 
particular type of separation. Hereby, the regulation requires legal separation of grid unit from 
the retail/production and the operation of the network by de jure independent grid unit 
management. Cremer et al. (2006) and Bolle and Breitmoser (2006) show that the stronger 
unbundling is enforced by law, the more network operators try to benefit from higher 
distribution charges, whereas downstream competition is reduced resulting in higher retail 
prices. In contrast, Höffler and Kranz (2011a) compare the effects of legal unbundling, 
ownership unbundling and vertical integration. They find lower retail prices with legal 
unbundling than with ownership unbundling and vertical integration. A legally separated 
price-regulated network operator maximizes only its own profit by maximizing the upstream 
output, therefore the operator has no incentive to discriminate downstream competitors. Thus, 
retail prices are lower than under vertical integration. By assuming retained informal 
interdependence between the legally unbundled upstream and downstream units, Höffler and 
Kranz (2011b) show that discrimination might again occur. We extended our theoretical 
                                                 
6
 The comparison of Vicker’s and Sappington’s approaches shows that the outcome of a raising rivals’ costs 
strategy does not depend on the type of downstream competition. Other studies on non-price discrimination with 
Cournot competition are e.g. Crew et al., 2005; Economides, 1998; and Bertrand competition: Beard et al., 2001; 
Sappington, 2006; Weisman, 1995. 
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model by adopting several vertical regulation schemes as applied in Höffler and Kranz (2011a 
and b). 
 
The literature presents a broad range of theoretical evidence of how vertical integration can 
affect retail prices. Nevertheless, only a very small number of articles provide empirical 
evidence by considering separation of the transmission networks.
7
 In this study we want to 
take up this challenge by analyzing the impact of vertical integration of retail incumbents 
(downstream) - mostly former monopolistic electricity suppliers - and distribution system 
operators (DSOs) (upstream) on retail prices and distribution charges in German household 
electricity markets. As the vertical structure is heterogeneous across the 850 German 
submarkets (there exist legally unbundled, vertically integrated or fully separated firms), we 
are able to analyze the effects of different structures and regulation schemes on electricity 
prices.  
 
The potential unbundling of distribution networks has received little attention in economic 
studies so far.
8
 As described above, vertically integrated incumbents might have an incentive 
to favor their own downstream unit over competitors. Delaying supplier-switching or 
withholding important information (e.g. customers’ energy consumption) from competitors 
are examples for non-price discrimination. Such a discriminatory behavior might affect the 
retail prices. To test our hypotheses derived from the theoretical model we employ cross-
sectional data for about 600 German geographically separated markets, each served by one 
DSO, one downstream incumbent and a number of small energy providers. Thus, we want to 
know whether price differences exist in different vertical structures. Using a simultaneous 
equations approach, we find significantly lower prices in markets with fully separated firms 
compared to markets with vertically integrated or legally unbundled firms. 
 
I. The German Electricity Sector 
 
The electricity sector can be subdivided in five interrelated stages: Generation, wholesale, 
transmission, distribution and retail. In Germany, four electricity producers, EnBW, E.on, 
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Transmission networks are the highest voltage lines that are used for long distance transmission whereas 
distribution grid is a regional network to supply end consumers.  
E.g. Steiner (2001) and Hattori & Tsuitsui (2001) investigate the effects of unbundling the transmission grid. 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) estimated the unbundling effects on prices and productivity for 15 European 
countries (in 1990-2003) finding that unbundling transmission from generation leads to lower prices and higher 
productivities. 
8
Nillesen and Pollitt (2008) study the effects of unbundling that was implemented in New Zealand for 
distribution grids. 
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RWE and Vattenfall, hold about 85 percent of the electricity generation capacities (with 
different generation sources). The remaining 15 percent of production capacities are either 
owned by local producers or foreign companies. Usually, capacities of small producers are 
used to cover the peak loads. The German transmission grid is geographically divided into 
four regional transmission grid monopolies covering the following regions: The EnBW area is 
located in South-Western Germany, Vattenfall in Eastern Germany, RWE in Western 
Germany. The remaining territory, which stretches from Northern Germany to Bavaria, 
belongs to E.ON.
9
  
 
Figure 1: Transmission Grid Areas in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to transmission, the distribution stage covers more than 850 geographically 
separated markets, which are, according to the German Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt), the relevant markets in case of market investigations. The markets have 
different distribution areas and densities, thus, they differ with electricity demand. Each of 
these markets has only one distribution network operator and only one retail incumbent 
(former monopolist). Figure 2 provides an overview over the German distribution markets. 
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Figure 2: Regional separation of the German Electricity Distribution Market  
 
 
 
In general, vertical integration allows for price and non-price discrimination of competitors. 
Therefore, in line with the 2005 Energy Act (EnWG), the Federal Network Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur) started the regulation of the grid access charge, the so-called distribution 
charge. Until 2009, the distribution charges were cost-based regulated. Recently, a new 
regulation scheme, incentive regulation (revenue-cap), was implemented. Thus, if a supplier 
serves a customer in a particular local submarket it has to pay the local distribution charge of 
the customer’s market. Besides distribution charge regulation, the Energy Act requires the 
legal unbundling of grid operators from other activities such as generation and retail, aiming 
to prevent non-price discrimination. Legal unbundling describes the functional and legal 
separation of the distribution network operator (DSO) from other activities in terms of 
management, information flows and accounting. Since 2007, grid operators with more than 
100,000 customers are obliged to separate their DSO by creating a new legal entity. Operators 
with smaller number of customers than the required threshold are allowed to remain vertically 
integrated. In contrast, ownership unbundling (or full separation) requires ownership 
independence of producers, grid operators and retail providers. However, this stricter 
regulation type has not yet been implemented in EU member states. As mentioned above, 
Germany has a very unique market structure; about 20 percent of German distribution 
operators are legally unbundled including voluntary separations, whereas 75 percent are 
vertically integrated and 5 percent are fully separated. 
 
6 
 
In addition to network regulation, the largest electricity supplier in each retail market for 
household customers is obliged to offer one so-called standard (basic) contract. This contract 
is a “fallback” for customers who decide to switch to an alternative contract. They 
automatically return to the standard contract either if their new provider leaves the market, or 
if their contract is cancelled by the supplier and customers have not decided which supplier to 
switch to (§§ 36 – 38, Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG)). Moreover, this means that after the 
market liberalization in 1998, customers who have not yet switched their supplier or contract 
(about 50 percent on average in each submarket) are supplied under the conditions of the high 
priced standard contract. Until today, former monopolists are the providers of these standard 
contracts. Besides the standard contract, former monopolists offer alternative contracts to 
retain more price-sensitive customers. About 44 percent of customers chose an alternative 
incumbent contract, whereas the rest (only about 6 percent) turned to alternative suppliers. 
Thus, incumbents’ still have high market share after the liberalization. 
 
II. Unbundling experience from other countries 
 
New Zealand is the first country that has implemented ownership separation of electricity 
distribution from other commercial activities. The separation, introduced in 1998 after 
electricity market restructuring in 1992, resulted in no significant retail price reductions. 
Nillesen and Pollitt (2008) analyze New Zealand’s economic effects of unbundling, 
employing a dataset between 1995 and 2007. They show that prices for commercial customers 
decreased, whereas residential electricity prices increased after the unbundling intervention.
10
 
Furthermore, unbundling caused a strong reduction in the number of competitors as energy 
producers acquired retailers. In their consideration of the unbundling effect on production and 
distribution costs, the authors find significant operational cost reductions. However, these 
were not passed on to customers in terms of lower distribution charges.  
Currently, the Netherlands is politically debating the ownership separation on the distribution 
level, which has been legally implemented since 2011. Nooij and Baarsma (2008) summarize 
the arguments stated in the literature that ownership separation positively affects competition. 
Among others, they show in a scenario analysis of the Dutch electricity sector that 
discriminatory activities and cross-subsidization of vertically related companies could appear. 
In contrast to this theory-based analysis, Mulder et al. (2005) find only a little evidence for a 
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 For commercial customers on average from NZ$ 18,99 to 13,72 cents, and for household customers from NZ$ 
14,40 to 18,60 cents after ownership unbundling. The average overall price remained constant (see Nillesen and 
Pollitt 2007, p. 30f). 
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price effect due to vertical separation with a broad cross-country analysis of vertical 
integration strategies. 
 
 
III. Theoretical Model 
 
With a simple theoretical model, we aim at illustrating the effects arising from non-price 
discrimination in different vertical structure settings on the downstream prices and derive 
hypotheses for our empirical analysis. We do not seek the non-price discrimination 
equilibrium in the theoretical model but rather analyze the incentives to sabotage the 
competitors and the impact on retail prices. We compare alternative types of non-price 
discrimination with alternative forms of vertical regulation.  
 
Consider a Hotelling game with uniformly distributed potential customers and two firms 
located at either end of a line.
11
 Firms offer electricity contracts with a given amount of 
electricity demand per contract. It is reasonable to assume that firms compete with 
differentiated contracts as, at least in Germany, the electricity price is not the only factor on 
which consumers decide. Consumers’ preference for a particular firm (brand) is also crucial. 
Furthermore, we assume that the incumbent, located at 0, is vertically integrated with the 
distribution system operator (DSO). The DSO provides a common input, “access” to the 
distribution grid at a cost-based regulated per-unit price b , the distribution charge. The DSO 
faces constant per unit costs uc , with ( )u ub c c . Each downstream firm demands one unit of 
network access per contract and each customer x ,  0,1x with the reservation price v , buys 
one contract from the incumbent or the entrant at prices Ip  or Ep , with 
* ,  ,iv p i I E  . 
Besides distribution charges, both firms bear constant marginal costs per contract ,  ,ic i I E  
for serving customers. 
Consumers pay different “transportation costs” which depend on their firm choice. If a 
consumer buys from the incumbent, transportation costs are I , and E  otherwise. In our 
setting, transportation costs represent the customer preferences for a particular supplier. The 
utility function of a customer is then defined as follows: 
 
,              if the customer buys from the incumbent
( )
(1 ),     otherwise. 
I I
E E
v p x
U x
v p x


 
 
  
    (1) 
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 We assume the market demand to be highly price-inelastic in the short run. 
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Because the distribution charge is regulated, the DSO could be interested in favoring its 
downstream unit over its competitor by engaging in non-price discriminating activities. We 
distinguish between two approaches which are cost-increasing, cs , and demand reducing, ds , 
form of discrimination. Cost-increasing discrimination can appear due to delays in (important) 
information provision e.g. on consumers’ energy consumption, whereas demand-reducing 
discrimination is e.g. due to delays in the contract switching process. While cost-increasing 
discrimination directly increases the entrant’s unit costs, demand-decreasing ‘investments’ 
simultaneously increase the preference for the incumbent but decrease the preference for the 
entrant, 0I
ds



, 0E
ds



.  
Discrimination induces costs ( , )c dC s s  to the DSO with increasing rate,  
2
'( 0,  ''( ) 0,  ) 0i i
i j
C
C s C s
s s

 

 ,  , , ,  i j c d i j  . 
 
As usual in Hotelling models, the demand split is defined by the marginal consumer ix  who is 
indifferent between the incumbent’s contract and the competitor’s contract. Thus, we get the 
incumbent’s demand I iD x  as: 
 
E I E
I i
I E
p p
D x

 
 
 

.          (2) 
 
and the demand for the competitor’s contract as 1E iD x  , with 
'( ) 0 i iD   and 
'( ) 0i jD   for  , ,i j I E .  
 
The entrant’s profit function, the incumbent’s downstream unit and the incumbent’s upstream 
unit profit functions E , ID  and IU  are given by: 
 
 E E E c Ep c b s D              (3) 
I ID IU     with          (4) 
 ID I I Ip c b D             (5) 
 ( ) ( , )IU u E I c db c D D C s s     ,       (6) 
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We assume a two stage game where, first, the vertically integrated incumbent chooses the 
discrimination strategy ( , )c dS S s s  and, second, downstream their prices simultaneously.  
 
Vertical integration 
 
We begin with vertical integration and the assumption that the incumbent maximizes the total 
profit of both units, that is max( )ID IU  . By backward induction, we get the best reply 
functions: 
1
( )
2
R
EI I Ep b c p     and 
1
( )
2
E
R
E c I Ip b c s p      . 
Cost-increasing discrimination increases the entrant’s price, ' ( ) 0E cp s
  , which confirms the 
findings of previous studies such as Economides (1998). In contrast, demand reducing 
discrimination shifts the entrant’s best-reply curve inwards and the incumbent’s best-reply 
curve outwards. The results are ambiguous: First, both equilibrium prices may be higher if the 
(positive) effect on the competitor’s transportation costs outweighs the (negative) effect on 
the incumbent’s transportation costs. Second, demand reducing discrimination induces the 
competitor to respond aggressively by reducing its price, which is also shown in Mandy and 
Sappington (2006). 
 
Lemma 1: 
(i) Cost-increasing discrimination raises the equilibrium downstream prices. The 
competitor’s price rises more than the incumbent’s price, 
2
3c
Ep
s



, 
1
3c
Ip
s



. 
(ii) Cost-increasing discrimination raises the incumbent’s demand by 
1
3( )
I
I Ec
D
s  


 
 and decreases the competitor’s demand by 
1
3( )c I E
ED
s  

 
 
. 
 
As cost-increasing discrimination forces the competitor to choose a higher price than without 
discrimination, the competitor loses a fraction of the customers. As a result, these customers 
turn to the incumbent. That allows the incumbent to charge a higher price. 
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Lemma 2: 
(i) Demand-decreasing sabotage raises the incumbent’s downstream price and 
decreases the competitor’s downstream price if 
1
2
2
I E I
d d ds s s
    
 
  
.
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(ii) Demand-decreasing sabotage raises the incumbent’s equilibrium demand 0
d
I
d
d
s
D
  
and decreases the competitor’s equilibrium demand 0
d
E
d
d
s
D
  as long as 
( ) ( )c c
d
E I
I E I
d
I E Ec c s c c s
s s
 
 
 
      



. This inequality holds for 
I Ec c , I cs  . 
In contrast to cost-increasing discrimination, the effects of demand-decreasing discrimination 
are ambiguous and depend on additional assumptions.  
 
We assume that the firms have the same unit costs, d ec c , i.e. they pay the same price for 
electricity at the wholesale level, and the impact of demand-decreasing discrimination on the 
competitor’s transportation costs is larger than the impact on the incumbent’s transportation 
costs, 
d
E I
ds s
  

 
. With these additional assumptions, the incumbent’s price increases with 
demand-decreasing discrimination (Lemma 2 (i)). 
In the following we first discus the exclusive effects of both discrimination types. According 
to Lemma 1 cost-increasing discrimination is profitable for the incumbent as this action 
increases both the incumbent’s price and also its demand. However, taking into account the 
impact on the incumbent’s network operator, cost-increasing discrimination decreases the 
competitor’s quantity and raises operator’s costs. As a consequence, the incumbent reaches 
the optimum discrimination level in the last stage with '( ) '( ) 0ID c IU cs s   . If price 
regulation is strictly implemented, which means ( )u ub c c , the incumbent neglects the 
(negative) discrimination effect on upstream profits and, therefore, prefers cost-increasing 
discrimination over non-discrimination if ( ) (0)I c Is 
  .  
                                                 
12
 If this assumption does not hold, the prices can move in the same direction, e.g. if the competitor’s price is 
very sensitive to changes in own transportation cost compared to the effect on the incumbent’s transportation 
cost, both prices increase. See in the appendix Lemma 2.  
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For the singular effect of demand-decreasing discrimination, i.e. 0cs  , we can derive similar 
conditions: We know from Lemma 2 (i) that the incumbent’s retail price increases and the 
competitor’s price decreases with discrimination. Given our assumptions the incumbent 
engages in demand-decreasing discrimination if ( ) (0)I d Is 
   holds. The intuition is as 
follows: An incremental increase in the competitor’s transportation cost and, simultaneously, 
an incremental decrease in the incumbent’s transportation cost allow the incumbent to charge 
higher prices for its contract and, at the same time, to win more customers. The incumbent’s 
profit rises as long as its marginal revenue exceeds the marginal costs of sabotage. In contrast, 
the competitor tries to keep its customers by reducing its price for the contract but does not 
win new customers, which, in turn, leads to lower profit. 
 
We know from Lemma 1 that the level of cost-increasing discrimination also affects the 
profitability of demand-decreasing discrimination and, therefore, we have to consider the joint 
outcome in the next step. The previous findings, ( ) (0)I c Is 
   and ( ) (0)I d Is 
  , show 
that non-price discrimination can be a preferable strategy for the vertically integrated 
incumbent. As we have seen, the total partial derivates of an incumbent’s equilibrium demand 
with respect to  ds  and cs  are positive without additional assumptions. However, introducing 
demand-decreasing and cost-increasing discrimination simultaneously, total partial derivates 
of the incumbent’s profit with respect to ds and cs  become mutually dependent. The mutual 
dependence appears when we consider the second derivatives for demand effects due to 
sabotage, so that, given our assumptions, these are negative 
2 2
0
c c d
I I
d
d D d D
ds s ds s
 
  . In contrast, 
the mutual impact of demand-decreasing and cost-increasing discrimination on the 
incumbent’s profit is positive, because 
2 2
0
d c c
I I
d
d d
ds s ds s
  
  .  
Employing both types of discrimination, the boundary condition cI s   in Lemma 2 ii is 
reached faster than with singular discrimination as demand-decreasing discrimination reduces 
I  and cost-increasing sabotage raises cs . Thus, the higher the maximum level of cost-
increasing discrimination, the lower the maximum level of demand-decreasing discrimination 
and vice versa. With the positive second derivatives and further intermediate results, we know 
that also ( , ) (0,0)I c d Is s 
   holds as long as cI s  . Therefore, employing the optimum 
12 
 
combination of both types of discrimination can result in a higher total profit than no 
discrimination. 
 
Proposition 1: With ( ) (0)I c Is 
  , ( ) (0)I d Is 
   and ( , ) (0,0)I c d Is s 
   , non-price 
discrimination can be a profitable strategy for the incumbent. 
 
The discussion in line with Proposition 1 provides theoretical evidence that incumbent’s price 
is always lower without non-price discrimination. Therefore, given our assumptions, the 
upstream firm has incentives to engage in non-price discrimination, which always results in a 
higher price than without any discrimination. In contrast, the competitor’s price choice 
depends on the magnitude of demand-decreasing discrimination and customers’ loyalty, i.e. 
the transportation costs. 
 
Fully separated firms 
 
We consider the outcome in the event of total separation as this is our reference structure for 
the hypotheses. Given our assumptions, the equilibrium outcome is straightforward: In case of 
total (full) separation the DSO has no incentives to discriminate. As each firm in our setting 
maximizes its own profits, the profit of the DSO is maximized without engaging in non-price 
discrimination, because discrimination is costly and market demand is constant, 
 ( ) ( , )u E I c db c D D C s s   <  ( ) 0u E Ib c D D   . Therefore, downstream prices are not 
affected by discrimination because the DSO does not take into account the discrimination 
effects on downstream profits. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In markets with vertically integrated firms, non-price discrimination results in 
higher retail prices of the incumbent compared to markets with fully (ownership) separated 
firms. 
 
Legal unbundling 
 
We adopt the ideas of Cremer et al. (2006) and Höffler and Kranz (2011a) and assume that 
the legally unbundled grid operator considers (or is forced to consider) only its grid activity 
and maximizes only the upstream profit, 
13 
 
 ( ) ( , )IU u E I c db c D D C s s     ,       (7) 
whereas the downstream incumbent maximizes total profit, upstream and downstream. With 
perfect legal unbundling the total profit is given by: 
    ( ) ( , )I ID IU I I I u E I c dp c b D b c D D C s s           .   (8) 
 
Given our assumptions, the grid operator earns the same profit independently of downstream 
market shares because the total market demand is constant and distribution charges are 
regulated. Therefore, discrimination only negatively affects the DSO’s profit and – with 
perfect legal unbundling – the grid operator has no incentive to discriminate. This outcome is 
in line with the findings of Höffler and Kranz (2011a).  
We check whether the partial consideration of grid profits affects the retail providers’ profit 
maximization strategies. Deriving the incumbent’s optimum retail price strategy brings us to 
* 1 (3 2 )
3
I I Ecp b s      .  
 
Proposition 2: With perfect legal unbundling, the grid operator maximizes its upstream profit 
with the equilibrium strategy (0,0)S . Therefore, the implementation of legal unbundling 
provides no incentive for non-price discrimination, in case it works perfectly. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Perfect legal unbundling provides the same results as total separation 
(ownership unbundling). Therefore, incumbents’ prices in markets with legal unbundling do 
not significantly differ from incumbents’ prices in markets with total (ownership) separation. 
 
Assuming that perfect legal unbundling eliminates the grid operator’s legal relationship in the 
retail incumbent, the grid operator ignores the downstream effect of its strategic decisions, 
thus having no incentive to act in favor of its retail parent firm. However, according to the 
special report (Sondergutachten, 2009) of the German Monopolies Commission on issues in 
German energy markets, the dependence of former vertically integrated operators remains 
strong even with legal unbundling. In particular, it is stated that upstream management 
decisions seem to be influenced by requirements of the retail incumbent. This might happen 
when the parent company is able to create an incentive-based relation to its affiliate.
13
 To 
create such a relation, the retail incumbent needs sufficient ownership shares in the grid 
                                                 
13
 See also Höffler and Kranz 2011b 
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operator to exert power (e.g. more than 50 percent).
14
 In case of lower shares, conflicts of 
interest might appear if other owners follow different aims. Thus, we formulate Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3: With imperfect legal unbundling, incentives for non-price discrimination 
exist(s) which initiate higher retail prices than with total separation. The incentives increase 
in ownership fraction. 
 
 
IV. Data Description 
 
In the previous section we have shown that cost-increasing and demand-reducing non-price 
discrimination types are profitable from a theoretical point of view and, that they both 
increase the incumbent’s electricity contract price. As sabotage is not observable (and difficult 
to detect by regulatory authorities), we are not able to test the theoretical model as such. 
However, we are able to analyze price differences for electricity contracts in markets with 
different vertical structures, controlling for market and customer characteristics. Thus, price 
differences could indicate non-price discrimination, as discussed in the theoretical model. 
 
Data Sources 
We use data from multiple sources to cover the vertical ownership structure, retail prices, 
distribution charges and customer characteristics. Ownership information is provided by 
Creditreform, the largest German wholesale commercial credit agency. Price and contract 
information aggregated at the zip code level stems from the internet platform Verivox which 
collects information on electricity contract offers. Low-voltage grid information and grid-
related information is provided by E’net, the database for network characteristics. Aggregated 
information about customer characteristics are taken from the Acxiom database, which 
provides global information for marketing services. 
We employ a cross-sectional approach using Data as of August 2008 that we aggregated at 
the distribution grid level.
15
 Quantity and price data are selected for an average household 
consumption level of 4000 kWh per year (3 - 4 persons). 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Of course, imperfect legal unbundling depends strongly on corporate governance. The discussed outcome is 
not the only equilibrium. 
15
 According to the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt), the relevant market for end consumers without 
real-time-metering is the low-voltage grid area of a DSO. 
15 
 
Data Adjustments
16
 
The most comprehensive calculations concern the calculation of ownership shares. The 
Creditreform database offers information about the ownership structure of each company in 
our sample. This information comprises both direct owners of the retail company and the grid 
operator, and additionally the complete link between the dependent company and the ultimate 
owners. Based on this information, we can calculate the individual share of an ultimate owner 
for each electricity company. However, what we finally need is the direct and the indirect 
ownership link of intermediate owners as we consider (only) the ownership structure of the 
retail provider and the grid owner.
17
 Total ownership of a grid owner by an electricity 
provider and vice versa are calculated independently of the number of intermediate owners. It 
is important to note that we consider markets individually, i.e. we ignore cross-ownerships 
between alternative incumbents and alternative grid owners. However, what cannot be taken 
into account in this study is the aspect of common owners on a higher level. 
The grid access charge consists of a fixed part, the sum of a fixed usage charge and the meter 
charge, and a variable part which depends on the usage level. Thus, the grid access charge for 
a particular usage level is the sum of these components. 
Our market definition is the same as suggested by the German Regulation Authority. Since 
incumbents’ standard contract prices apply in the area where only one incumbent or DSO 
serves, we use that as the relevant market. Usually areas served by only one DSO are not 
identical with zip code areas - the level at which we have customer information. Therefore, 
we have first to aggregate the information at the grid area level. To do this we calculate 
weights using three- and four-person households for the aggregation of customer information 
to the grid level. 
 
Data Description of the Key Variables 
The descriptive information is summarized in Table 1 in the appendix. The information used 
in the estimations covers about 600 geographically separated electricity (relevant) markets. 
In about 6 percent of all retail electricity markets in our sample network operators and retail 
incumbents are fully separated (ownership unbundling). In 16 percent, companies are legally 
unbundled. As there are also voluntary legal separations, we take the number of meter points 
as a proxy for the number of connected customers, thus, as a proxy for the threshold required 
for legal unbundling. Therefore, we can distinguish between required legal unbundling and 
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 Because of the particular aggregation level of consideration, we have adjusted our data set to the market level 
instead of zip code level. 
17
 We appreciate inexhaustible support by our colleague Thorsten Doherr. 
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voluntary legal unbundling.
18
 We consider the cases with partial ownership (for example with 
70 percent share in DSO) as voluntarily separated, because partial ownership indicates that 
firms choose to hold stake in DSO without being obliged to separate their activities as they 
are not fully integrated. These firms might have more than 100,000 meter points (the 
threshold level for legal unbundling required by the German regulator). About 7 percent of 
the firms in our sample have more than 100,000 meter points, are legally unbundled but are 
fully owned by the parent company, so that they were obliged to separate the DSO (required 
legal unbundling). On the other hand, nearly 9 percent of the firms have voluntarily 
unbundled. These firms have either more or less customers than the threshold level. If they 
have more than the threshold, they are not fully owned by the incumbent. In 78 percent of 
markets, retail incumbents and distribution grid operators are one company, i.e. they are fully 
integrated and not legally separated. Thus, in these regions the standard contract provider has 
a strong information advantage over its competitors. It has knowledge of the quantities 
provided by competitors and, moreover, it knows exactly the customers served by its 
competitors. Note that we do not consider the ownership direction (who owns whom) because 
only in 3 cases out of 42, the DSO owns the retail incumbent. Therefore, we neglect the 
analyses of ownership direction in our estimates. 
 
Turning to dependent variables, we find the standard contract price to be on average 44 Euros 
more expensive than the incumbent’s lowest price offer. However, the lowest price offer of 
competitors which is comparable to the incumbent offers is on average more than 120 Euros 
cheaper than the standard contract. Taking into account pre-payment offers, the reduction is 
about 170 Euros for household customers. In line with the explanations in the Monitoring 
Report of the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), the distribution charge 
determines about 26.0 percent of the standard contract price in our sample. 
 
V. Econometric Model 
 
Due to missing information about company specific incentive schemes and internal 
information on vertical relations between the grid owner and the retail incumbent, we are 
unable to fully specify the explanatory equations. However, this latent information might have 
an effect on both the distribution charges and retail prices as described in the theoretical 
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 Note that voluntary ‘legal unbundling’ is not the same as required ‘legal unbundling’ because in case of 
voluntary separation, the firms are not obliged to separate the information flows and management. 
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model. We therefore employ a simultaneous equation model, where the distribution charge 
enters the standard contract price equation, the incumbent’s most competitive contract price 
equation, and the competitors’ lowest price equation. Along with the standard contract price 
we also consider incumbents’ competitive prices to count for effects caused by price 
discrimination and competitors’ prices (the lowest market price) to capture the cross-prise 
effects. These are equilibrium prices. Ownership variables are used as explanatory variables 
for both the distribution charge equation and the price equations. We use the three stage least 
squares estimation method because we assume that the error terms correlate across the 
specified equations due to “shocks” that affect all endogenous variables. 
We therefore end up with the following specification: 
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We include control variables for grid characteristics and regional characteristics into the 
distribution charge equation, and control variables to characterize relevant markets in the 
price equations. Grid characteristics are proxied by grid area, the size of the distribution 
region, supply density (population divided by grid area) and population density. As some 
variables for grid characteristics are correlated, we consider only the number of meter points 
(correlated with grid area) and supply density in our estimations. Regional characteristics 
include information about customers such as total population and regional purchasing power.  
For reasons of comparison, we employ alternative ownership measures and different 
specifications of the equations. First, we estimate the model including dummy variables for 
markets with fully separated, fully integrated and legally unbundled incumbents. In the case 
of legally unbundled firms, we distinguish between required and voluntary legal unbundling 
(specification A). Second, we take into account the number of competitors which have 
18 
 
entered the markets (specification B) because we assume that the number of competitors, 
which is a proxy for competition intensity, has an impact on market prices.
19
   
Furthermore, we distinguish contracts with and without prepayments, i.e. contracts which 
have or have not to be completely paid in advance, and estimate our model twice including 
contracts without prepayment and contracts with prepayment as we assume both types of 
contracts to address alternative customer groups. As the results with regard to our hypotheses 
do not differ, we only report the results for contracts without prepayment.  
There might be concerns about the endogeneity of ownership structure. For example, if the 
error term captures an important variable that influences the price setting of firms and at the 
same time this variable was the driving force for integration or voluntary separation. 
However, the ownership structure, in particular the integration, of German incumbents are 
mostly the same as it was before market liberalization. Firms serving less than 100,000 
customers were historically integrated and mostly remain integrated. For example, the number 
of business and industry customers in the area could influence the decision to integrate but do 
not necessarily affect the retail prices for household customers since these are different 
markets. The voluntary separation of incumbents with fewer customers than the threshold for 
the required separation occurred, as we presume, for reasons of taxation or simply for 
financial separation and regulation. Beside that some of the incumbents merge their network 
operators to take advantage of economies of scale. We control for that in our estimation by 
considering the grid characteristics.  
 
VI. Estimation Results and Discussion 
 
The estimation results are displayed in Table 2 in the appendix. In specification A, we 
examine the vertical structure ignoring the number of competitors in a market. In contrast, in 
specification B the number of competitors is taken into account. Full vertical integration is the 
reference category for the vertical structure dummy variables.  
 
Following the theoretical model in line with Hypothesis 1, incumbent contract prices are 
expected to be lower in markets with ownership separated upstream monopolists compared 
with markets where the incumbents are vertically integrated. The empirical results support the 
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 As, for example, used in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) in the entry game, where the authors consider the price 
effects depending on the number of competitors. 
We also use the share of voluntarily legally unbundled firms to analyse whether the pricing behaviour is affected 
by the control of the parent company. In contrast to our conjecture (in hypothesis 3) that higher shares might 
have a stronger influence on prices, we find no significant results and therefore refrain from reporting the 
estimation results in the article. 
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expectations. Thus, Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. The findings suggest that in markets 
where the downstream incumbent and the DSO are either fully integrated or legally separated, 
prices for contracts offered by the incumbent are on average higher than in markets with fully 
separated incumbents.
 20
 Nevertheless, the prices for lowest-priced-contracts of competitors in 
markets with integrated incumbents do not differ from prices in markets with total separation. 
However, observing these estimation results, it could be concluded that higher incumbent 
prices in vertical integrated markets indicate non-price discrimination. 
 
Hypothesis 2 - lower incumbent prices in markets with perfectly working legal unbundling -  
must be rejected because we find no evidence for legal unbundling to be favorable for 
customers’ surplus in terms of retail price. The prices for the standard contract and for 
incumbents’ low-price competitive contracts are not affected by any regulative unbundling 
options.
21
 One reason might be that major vertically integrated firms which were obliged to 
legally separate their distribution activities might lease back the network by charging 
sabotage-conform leasing rates (as argued in Sondergutachten, 2009 of German Monopolies 
Commission).
22 
The German Federal Network Agency and the Monopolies Commission also 
complain about the insufficient realization of operational separation of network activities. In 
addition, the results show that too competitors’ prices are not significantly lower in markets 
with legally unbundled firms. Moreover, we do not observe any price difference in markets 
with required and voluntarily legal unbundling. In contrast, the alternative Hypothesis 3 - in 
the case of imperfect legal unbundling prices do not differ from prices under vertical 
integration - cannot be rejected because we do not observe any difference in prices between 
legal unbundling and vertical integration. However, the ownership share has no impact on 
pricing behavior. According to the theoretical results our empirical findings indicate that legal 
unbundling does not work perfectly. Therefore, the European Regulators need to force further 
legal unbundling and, besides the charge regulation, to be aware of possible non-price 
discrimination effects that arise from imperfect legal unbundling. In particular, we suggest 
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 In specification B (estimation includes the number of competitors) the coefficient of ownership unbundling in 
our standard contract price equation is not significant at confidence interval of 95 %. However, the threshold of 
the p value to be significant at  * p<0.1is just failed. Thus, we argue that the price for incumbent’s standard 
contract is lower in markets with totally separated firms. The findings in specification A and the significance of 
the coefficient for ownership unbundling in the equation for incumbent’s lowest price in specification B enforce 
our argument. 
21
 Although the lowest market price is significantly negative in voluntary legally unbundled markets, in 
specification B, the coefficient is negligibly small. Thus, we argue that the prices are de facto equal in case of 
vertical integration and voluntary legal unbundling. 
22
 See Monopolkommission (2009) p. 94 and also Bundesnetzagentur (2008) Monitoring 2008.  
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implementing rules that control and standardize the switching process. Furthermore, the 
Regulators must be sensitive to customers’ and competitors’ complaints. 
 
Considering the distribution charges and the impact of vertical integration, we confirm the 
results reported by Kwoka (2005) and by Growitsch et al. (2009)
23
, showing economies of 
scale in distribution network. We find that a marginal increase in the number of meter points 
(and total distributed electricity) marginally decreases distribution charges for household 
customers. The vertical structure and regulatory unbundling options, among others, are also 
used to examine the factors that determine the distribution charges. While we have expected a 
positive effect of vertical integration on distribution charges due to potential economies of 
scope (retail activity and distribution), we find no support for this argument.
24
 In contrast, in 
markets with voluntarily legally unbundled electricity providers we find significantly higher 
distribution charges compared to markets with fully integrated or ownership-unbundled 
providers. This result provides evidence that potential economies of scope do not decrease 
distribution charges. The implications are: 1) vertical integration indeed does not provide 
economies of scope, thus, distribution charges remain unaffected regardless of the vertical 
structure, and 2) the regulator is not perfectly informed about actual costs.  Consequently, if 
economies of scope in fact exist, this outcome indicates raising rivals’ costs, according to 
Vickers (1995).  
 
“Economies of scale [scope] are frequently cited as the major reason to allow shared 
services and sharing of personnel. In 80% of responding countries, shared services, 
i.e. services performed by the integrated company for the DSO, are permitted and 
regulators have access to the underlying contracts. However, in about 4 out of 5 
[European] Member States it has not been demonstrated that sharing services leads to 
lowering costs. It might be interesting for regulators to investigate this area in order to 
have a clear idea on the benefits of shared services.” 25.  
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 See also Filipini (1996) and Piacenza et al. (2009).  
24
 A limitation of the study is that we only consider distribution charges for household customers and disregard 
distribution charges for industrial customers with real-time. 
25
 European Energy Regulators (ERGEG), 2009 p.9. In this status report of ERGEG, economies of scale are 
defined as synergies that arise from sharing services between retail activities and electricity distribution. 
However, we define these synergies as economies of scope, because retail and distribution are entirely different 
“products”. 
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According to responses to the European Energy Regulators [ERGEG (2009)] questionnaire, 
common shared services are IT, legal services, communication, human resources, accounting, 
and financial services. However, sharing services apparently does not lead to economies of 
scope. Observing our estimation results, we recommend quantifying potential economies of 
scope that arise from shared services. Similarly, ERGEG (2009) argues that “shared services 
could lead to cross-subsidization and indicates the need to further investigate this issue.”26 
 
In line with our previous study (Nikogosian and Veith, 2011) we find a significant impact of 
distribution charges on standard contract prices. The extension to the incumbent’s low-price 
competitive contract and competitors’ contracts shows also a significant impact of distribution 
charges on competitive prices. Comparing the size of distribution charges across the four high 
voltage zones, we find the highest distribution charges in the Vattenfall area in east Germany. 
The significant deviation is mainly caused by higher depreciation rates due to network 
investments during the 1990s.  
 
We find no significant effect of the number of ultimate owners-measure on prices and 
distribution charge. Considering the outcome for variables representing the demand side in 
submarkets, we find that lowest-priced-contract prices are higher in regions with a higher 
purchasing power. However, the effect is negligibly small. Furthermore, there is no 
significant effect on the standard contract price induced by purchasing power. In markets with 
a higher population higher price for standard contract are found. Also in this case the 
coefficient is close to zero. 
 
As we also consider the number of competitors in distinct markets (in specification B), the 
results show a significant impact of the number of competitors on market prices. Surprisingly, 
the effects are opposite for the incumbents and competitors. That is, the competitors’ prices 
for the lowest-priced-contract are negatively affected by the number of competitors, whereas 
the incumbents’ prices increase with the number of competitors.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
We consider the impact of vertical relations on retail and distribution prices in the German 
electricity sector. According to a recent research, price regulation of an input product in a 
market with upstream monopolist can only partially prevent discrimination of downstream 
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 ERGEG, 2009 p.15 
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competitors. In a theoretical model, we show that upstream monopolist with regulated 
distributed charges prices could use non-price discrimination to increase competitors’ 
marginal costs or to decrease their demand and, thus, affect downstream prices. Legal 
unbundling is brought forward in political debates as well as in the literature as a regulatory 
option to prevent non-price discriminatory behavior. Such a regulation could be advantageous 
because it is less restrictive than ownership unbundling or total separation. However, we show 
that a lax implementation of legal unbundling can still provide incentives for non-price 
discrimination.  
  
We test the findings of our theoretical model using firm level data for nearly 600 regional 
German electricity markets for household customers. We find significant differences in the 
retail pricing behavior of incumbents based on alternative vertical ownership structures. In 
markets with fully separated incumbents (equal to ownership unbundling), retail prices for 
incumbents’ contracts are lower than in markets with fully integrated incumbents. 
Furthermore, we find no evidence for legal unbundling being the preferable regulatory 
instrument, because prices in markets with legally unbundled firms do not differ from prices 
in markets with vertically integrated firms. These results show that legal unbundling might 
not work perfectly because firms could circumvent the rules that ensure independence. To 
prevent non-price discrimination stricter regulation of legally unbundled incumbents can be 
implemented. 
 
One shortcoming of our study is that we only focus on pricing aspects in our analysis. In 
particular, we do not consider any costs or investment aspects which have been brought 
forward in a range of theoretical articles. Nevertheless, our results provide empirical 
indications about the role of alternative forms of vertical unbundling regulation and their 
impact on downstream competition. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lowest price without 
prepayment) 
572 754.67 26.54 617.88 824.00 
lowest incum. price 572 832.18 40.07 680.00 958.44 
standard contr. price 572 876.70 42.33 734.60 999.61 
      
Legally 
Unbundled 
Required 
Legal 
Unbundling 
572 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Voluntary 
Legal 
Unbundling 
572 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Ownership unbundled 572 0.06 0.24 0 1 
      
number of competitors 572 43.83 6.49 12 73 
distribution charge 572 228.39 30.01 149.71 314.20 
population 572 92407.43 279465.50 947 3410000 
purchasing power 572 104.59 81.93 0.24 490.90 
population/area 572 2257.82 2202.05 2.97 33220.43 
meter points 572 52215.05 164800.10 3 2322236 
      
number of owner of  
retail incumbent 
572 5.46 7.88 1 61 
number of owner of 
DSO 
572 5.60 7.87 1 61 
      
hv zone EnBW 572 0.14 0.35 0 1 
hv zone TenneT 572 0.41 0.49 0 1 
hv zone RWE 572 0.24 0.43 0 1 
hv zone Vattenfall 572 0.18 0.39 0 1 
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Table 2: Estimation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
A) Estimation without the number of competitors 
  1) 2) 3) 4) 
Prices without 
prepayment 
 
log lowest 
price) 
log lowest incum. 
price) 
log standard contr. 
price) 
log distribution 
charge) 
Legally 
Unbundled 
Required 
Legal 
Unbundling 
0.008 
0.007) 
0.012 
0.009) 
0.001 
0.009) 
-0.029 
0.021) 
     
Voluntary 
Legal 
Unbundling 
-0.008 
0.006) 
0.005 
0.007) 
0.007 
0.007) 
0.031* 
0.017) 
Ownership unbundled -0.002 -0.018** -0.014* 0.002 
 0.007) 0.008) 0.008) 0.020) 
Log(distribution charge) 0.357*** 0.276*** 0.249***  
 0.026) 0.036) 0.036)  
Log(population) 0.000 -0.000 0.006***  
 0.001) 0.002) 0.002)  
Log(purchasing power) 0.004** 0.001 -0.004  
 0.002) 0.003) 0.003)  
Log(# of owner of  retail 
incumbent)  
 0.006*** 0.009***  
  0.002) 0.002)  
Log(# of owner of DSO)    0.007** 
    0.003) 
log (population/area)    -0.006 
    0.004) 
log (meter points)    -0.015*** 
    0.003) 
hv zone EnBW    -0.006 
     0.023) 
hv zone TenneT    0.011 
     0.022) 
hv zone RWE    0.031 
     0.022) 
hv zone Vattenfall    0.162*** 
     0.024) 
     
Constant 4.668*** 5.215*** 5.373*** 5.556*** 
 0.150) 0.203) 0.203) 0.042) 
Observations 572 572 572 572 
 
 
*** p<0.01,   ** p<0.05,   * p<0.1 
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B) Estimation including the number of competitors 
  1) 2) 3) 4) 
Prices without 
prepayment 
 
log lowest 
price) 
log lowest incum. 
price) 
log standard contr. 
price) 
log distribution 
charge) 
Legally 
Unbundled 
Required 
Legal 
Unbundling 
0.009 
0.007) 
0.012 
0.009) 
-0.000 
0.009) 
-0.030 
0.021) 
     
Voluntary 
Legal 
Unbundling 
-0.009* 
0.006) 
0.006 
0.007) 
0.009 
0.007) 
0.031* 
0.017) 
Ownership unbundled -0.003 -0.017** -0.012 0.003 
 0.007) 0.008) 0.008) 0.020) 
Log(# competitors) -0.022*** 0.019* 0.054***  
 0.008) 0.012) 0.012)  
Log(distribution charge) 0.358*** 0.289*** 0.282***  
 0.026) 0.036) 0.036)  
Log(population) 0.001 -0.000 0.005***  
 0.001) 0.002) 0.002)  
Log(purchasing power) 0.003* 0.002 -0.001  
 0.002) 0.003) 0.003)  
Log(# of owner of  retail 
incumbent)   
 0.005*** 0.008***  
  0.002) 0.002)  
Log(# of owner of DSO)    0.007** 
    0.003) 
Log(population/area)    -0.005 
    0.004) 
Log(meter points)    -0.015*** 
    0.003) 
hv zone EnBW    0.005 
     0.023) 
hv zone TenneT    0.008 
     0.022) 
hv zone RWE    0.027 
     0.022) 
hv zone Vattenfall    0.162*** 
     0.024) 
     
Constant 4.747*** 5.071*** 4.981*** 5.554*** 
 0.157) 0.218) 0.217) 0.042) 
Observations 572 572 572 572 
 
 
*** p<0.01,   ** p<0.05,   * p<0.1 
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Appendix B 
 
Mathematical Derivations 
 
Equilibrium Prices  
Incumbent’s profit in case of vertical integration is composed of downstream profit and 
upstream profit and is given by: 
    ( , )I I u I uI E c dp c c D d c D C s s       
 
The demand for one contract offered by incumbent is characterized by the marginal consumer 
who is willing to buy the contract from the incumbent: 
E I E
I
I E
p p
D

 
 


 
The demand for the competitor is given by: 
1 I E EE
I E
p p
D

 
 
 

 
Given this information we can calculate the equilibrium prices: 
1
(3 2 2 )
3
1
(3 2 2 2 )
3
I c
E c
I E I E
I E I E
p b c c s
p b c c s
 
 


    
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and the profit function before choosing the sabotage strategy: 
( )( 2 )1
(
3
( 2 )(3 3 2 )
, ]       ) [
3( )
u c
I
c
I E I E
I E
E I I E E I u c
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Comparative Statics 
 
Lemma 2 is derived from the derivates of equilibrium prices and equilibrium demand with 
respect to demand-decreasing sabotage in the last stage i.e. before the sabotage strategy is 
chosen): 
 
1
(2 )
)
1
3
( 2
3
I EE
d d d
I
d
I
d d
E
p
s s s
p
s s s
 
 


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 
  
  
 
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a. Demand-decreasing sabotage increases incumbent’s downstream price and, at 
the same time, decreases competitor’ downstream price given that our 
assumptions hold and if 
1
2
2
I E I
d d ds s s
    
 
  
. 
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b. increases both equilibrium downstream prices given that our assumptions hold 
and if 2E I
d ds s
  

 
, i.e. competitor’s price is very sensitive to changes in 
own transportation cost compared to the effect on incumbent’s transportation 
cost, 
c. vice versa, decreases both equilibrium downstream prices given that our 
assumptions hold and if 
1
2
E I
d ds s
  

 
, 
 
 
2
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a. Demand-reducing sabotage increases incumbent’s equilibrium demand 
0
d
I
d
d
s
D
  and decreases competitor’s equilibrium demand 0
d
E
d
d
s
D
  given that 
our assumptions hold and ( ) ( )c c
d
E I
I E I E I E
d
c c s c c s
s s
 
 
 
     
 
. 
This inequality is true when the companies are comparably efficient, d ec c , 
and incumbent’s transportation cost is lower than the competitor’s sabotage 
cost, cI s  . 
 
 
 
 
